Ενώ οι τοποθετήσεις της κυβέρνησης, όλο και περισσότερο την απογυμνώνουν ... «βγάζουν
μάτι», συνεχείς κινήσεις εντυπωσιασμού δίνουν και παίρνουν, όπως πχ. η καταπληκτική παραίνεση Τσίπρα στον Γερμανό ΥΠΟΙΚ, (λέγεται πως ο Σόιμπλε έβαλε τα κλάματα από συγκίνηση...)
«Θα ήθελα φιλικά να του επισημάνω ότι θα ήταν καλύτερα να λυπάται τους λαούς που περπατάνε με το κεφάλι σκυφτό»
Σήμερα μάλιστα βγήκε στον αέρα και αυτό:
«Κίνηση – ματ από την κυβέρνηση! Δίνει στον «αέρα» όλα τα έγγραφα, non paper και παρουσιάσεις των Eurogroup»!
Το περιεχόμενο των παρεμβάσεων του υπουργού
Οικονομικών, Γ. Βαρουφάκη, στις δύο τελευταίες συνεδριάσεις του Γιούρογκρουπ
(στις 11 και 16 Φλεβάρη), καθώς και των σχετικών non-paper της ελληνικής
κυβέρνησης, υλικά τα οποία δόθηκαν στις 18 στα αγγλικά στη δημοσιότητα από το
υπουργείο Οικονομικών, είναι αποκαλυπτικό του αντιλαϊκού χαρακτήρα των
παζαριών που διεξάγει η κυβέρνηση με τους «εταίρους», για λογαριασμό του
εγχώριου κεφαλαίου.
Σταχυολογώντας ορισμένα βασικά σημεία από
αυτά τα πολυσέλιδα υλικά ξεχωρίζουμε τα εξής:
1. Η τρόικα που φεύγει, αλλά μένει: «Οι
πολίτες μας απέρριψαν το ρόλο της "τρόικας" στην Ελλάδα. Η
κυβέρνησή μας ωστόσο θα διατηρήσει το διάλογο και θα συνεχίσει να συνεργάζεται
πλήρως με την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, την ΕΚΤ, το ΔΝΤ, ως χώρα - μέλος της ΕΕ,
της Ευρωζώνης και του Ταμείου», τονίζει ο Γ. Βαρουφάκης, επιβεβαιώνοντας
ότι ο λαός θα παραμείνει αλυσοδεμένος στα δεσμά των ιμπεριαλιστικών οργανισμών
που συμμετέχει η ελληνική αστική τάξη.
2. Παράταση της «δανειακής σύμβασης».
Ηδη από την πρώτη συνεδρίαση του Γιούρογκρουπ (δηλαδή, στις 11/2), η
κυβέρνηση θέτει θέμα 6μηνης επέκτασης της δανειακής σύμβασης, προσπαθώντας κατά
τ' άλλα να τη διαχωρίσει από τα μνημόνια με τα οποία είναι άρρηκτα δεμένη: «Καταλαβαίνουμε
πλήρως ότι οι ημερομηνίες που σχετίζονται με την υπάρχουσα δανειακή σύμβαση
πρέπει να μετατεθούν προς τα μπρος, έτσι ώστε να παρέχουν
σταθερότητα, να δοθεί χρόνος για τις συζητήσεις (...) Είμαστε έτοιμοι να
ζητήσουμε μια αναθεώρηση αυτών των ημερομηνιών (...) Προτείνουμε το πρόγραμμα -
γέφυρα να καλύψει την περίοδο μέχρι τα τέλη Αυγούστου».
Δηλαδή, η κυβέρνηση πρότεινε μόνη της την
παράταση της δανειακής σύμβασης, άρα και του μνημονίου, ήδη από τις 11/2, και
όχι το κείμενο του Μοσκοβισί στις 16/2 που, σύμφωνα με τον Αλ. Τσίπρα,
βρίσκεται στο «όριο των κόκκινων γραμμών» του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ!
Επιβεβαιώνοντας το γεγονός ότι η παράταση
της δανειακής σύμβασης πηγαίνει «πακέτο» με τους αντιλαϊκούς όρους της, ο Γ.
Βαρουφάκης, στη δεύτερη συνεδρίαση του Γιούρογκρουπ (στις 16/2) ξεκαθαρίζει
τους όρους στους οποίους θα δεσμεύεται η ελληνική κυβέρνηση σε αυτήν την
περίπτωση: «Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση επαναλαμβάνει τη δέσμευσή της στους
όρους της δανειακής της σύμβασης προς όλους τους δανειστές μας. Η
ελληνική κυβέρνηση δε θα αναλάβει καμία δράση που απειλεί να εκτροχιάσει το
πλαίσιο του υπάρχοντος κρατικού προϋπολογισμού ή που θα έχει επιπτώσεις
στην οικονομική σταθερότητα. Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση δε θα αναλάβει καμία δράση
κουρέματος της ονομαστικής αξίας των δανείων».
Προσθέτει, επίσης, ότι η κυβέρνηση συμφωνεί
να υπάρξει «μια πλήρης αξιολόγηση από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή στο τέλος αυτής
της προσωρινής περιόδου».
3. Εφαρμογή πάνω από το 70% των «δράσεων»
των μνημονίων. Παραπέρα, για να μην αφήνει καμιά αμφιβολία ως προς τις
δεσμεύσεις της και στη διάρκεια του λεγόμενου «προγράμματος - γέφυρα», η
κυβέρνηση στο non-paper που διένειμε κατά τις διαπραγματεύσεις τονίζει: «Κατά
τη διάρκεια της "γέφυρας" (...) η κυβέρνηση θα ιεραρχήσει την
εφαρμογή αυτών των δράσεων που περιλαμβάνονται στις υπάρχουσες συμφωνίες
που είναι πλήρως συνεπείς με την πολιτική της εντολή. Συνολικά, θα
αντιπροσωπεύουν πάνω από το 70% της συνολικής λίστας των δράσεων που είχαν
συμφωνηθεί προηγουμένως».
4. «Επίτευγμα» η «δημοσιονομική
προσαρμογή». Η συγκυβέρνηση ΣΥΡΙΖΑ - ΑΝΕΛ επιβεβαιώνει ότι αναγνωρίζει ως «επίτευγμα»
στο οποίο θα βασιστεί - άρα και θα το συνεχίσει - την τεράστια «δημοσιονομική
προσαρμογή», η οποία επιτεύχθηκε μέσα από το τσάκισμα του λαού όλα τα τελευταία
χρόνια (επισημαίνοντας παράλληλα το «κοινωνικό κόστος» του, όπως έκανε και η
προηγούμενη κυβέρνηση): «Η Ελλάδα έχει πετύχει μια τεράστια προσαρμογή τα
τελευταία πέντε χρόνια με μεγάλο κοινωνικό κόστος. Το έλλειμμά της είναι
τώρα κάτω από 3% (...), το πρωτογενές της πλεόνασμα έφτασε το 1,5% στο τέλος
του προηγούμενου χρόνου (...) Η νέα κυβέρνηση παίρνει ως σημείο εκκίνησης
αυτήν την προσαρμογή».
5. «Βελτίωση του επιχειρηματικού
κλίματος». Η κυβέρνηση δεσμεύεται στην προώθηση «βαθιών διαρθρωτικών
αλλαγών» με στόχο την καπιταλιστική ανάκαμψη, με την «κρίσιμη» βοήθεια των
οργανισμών που συναποτελούν την τρόικα, καθώς και του ΟΟΣΑ. Μεταξύ άλλων
«μεταρρυθμίσεων» που αναφέρει σε αυτό το πλαίσιο (στο Φορολογικό, στη Δημόσια
Διοίκηση, στη Δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.), ιδιαίτερη έμφαση δίνει στη «βελτίωση του
επιχειρηματικού κλίματος» και την ενίσχυση των κρατικών επενδύσεων για τη
στήριξη του εγχώριου κεφαλαίου. Αναφέρει συγκεκριμένα: «Θέλουμε να
αναζωογονήσουμε σχέδια υποδομής με δημόσιους και ιδιώτες επενδυτές (...)
Θέλουμε να επενδύσουμε για τη μείωση του ενεργειακού κόστους στις μεσαίες
και μεγάλες βιομηχανίες, για τη στήριξη της καινοτομίας (...), για να
προωθήσουμε μια αλλαγή κατεύθυνσης προς τομείς με συγκριτικά πλεονεκτήματα
και εξαγωγικές δυνατότητες».
6. Ιδιωτικοποιήσεις. Παραπέρα, ο Γ.
Βαρουφάκης διαρρηγνύει τα ιμάτιά του διαμαρτυρόμενος για όσους κατηγορούν την
κυβέρνηση ότι δε θέλει τις ιδιωτικοποιήσεις: «Σε ό,τι αφορά τις
ιδιωτικοποιήσεις (...) η κυβέρνηση είναι εντελώς μη δογματική.
Είμαστε έτοιμοι και πρόθυμοι να αξιολογήσουμε κάθε σχέδιο ξεχωριστά. Οι
αναφορές σε Μέσα Ενημέρωσης ότι η ιδιωτικοποίηση του λιμανιού του Πειραιά
αναιρέθηκε δε θα μπορούσαν να είναι περισσότερο αναληθείς. Στην πραγματικότητα
συμβαίνει ακριβώς το αντίθετο, καθώς οι άμεσες ξένες επενδύσεις θα
ενθαρρύνονται, εφόσον το κράτος διασφαλίζει μακροπρόθεσμα έσοδα και λόγο
στις εργασιακές σχέσεις και τα περιβαλλοντικά θέματα»...
Η κυβέρνηση «εξηγεί» ότι δε διαφωνεί με τις
ιδιωτικοποιήσεις, αλλά με την πλήρη πώληση περιουσιακών στοιχείων του κράτους
σε αυτήν την περίοδο κρίσης στην αγορά, οπότε δε θα υπάρχει αντίστοιχο
«όφελος». Χαρακτηριστικά, στην παρέμβασή του στη δεύτερη συνεδρίαση του
Γιούρογκρουπ (στις 16/2), ο Γ. Βαρουφάκης αναφέρει: «Θα μπορούσα, για
παράδειγμα, να εξευμενίσω τους πάντες αποδεχόμενος το στόχο των 5 δισ. ευρώ από
ιδιωτικοποιήσεις (...) Ξέρω όμως ότι δεν μπορώ να τον φέρω σε πέρας. Οπως και
οι προηγούμενες κυβερνήσεις δεν μπόρεσαν να τον φέρουν σε πέρας σε μια αγορά
όπου καταρρέουν οι τιμές».
7. Για τα ψίχουλα διαχείρισης της ακραίας
φτώχειας. Εξίσου χαρακτηριστικές είναι και οι «εξηγήσεις» που δίνει ο Γ.
Βαρουφάκης για μέτρα διαχείρισης της ακραίας φτώχειας που έχει εξαγγείλει η
συγκυβέρνηση. Π.χ. για τη 13η σύνταξη σε όσους παίρνουν σύνταξη κάτω από 700
ευρώ, αναφέρει ότι αυτή «αφορά συνταξιούχους που ζουν στο όριο της φτώχειας
ή κάτω από αυτό και μεταφράζεται σε λιγότερο από δύο ευρώ τη μέρα για κάθε
δικαιούχο». Αντίστοιχα, για τη «σταδιακή επαναφορά» του κατώτατου
μισθού σε επίπεδα 2012, ξεκαθαρίζει ότι θα γίνει «μετά από διαβουλεύσεις με
τους εργοδότες και τα συνδικάτα», καθώς και ότι θα συνοδεύεται από
«μεταρρυθμίσεις» - αντισταθμίσματα («στην Κοινωνική Ασφάλιση, στη μείωση
της φορολογίας της εργασίας», δηλαδή των ασφαλιστικών εισφορών), ώστε
να μη μειωθεί η «ανταγωνιστικότητα του ιδιωτικού τομέα».
Κυνηγώντας χίμαιρες
«Η Ευρώπη αλλάζει», έλεγε πριν από τις
εκλογές ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, υπονοώντας ότι η εκλογή του στην κυβέρνηση θα πυροδοτούσε
γενικότερες αλλαγές προς όφελος του λαού συνολικά στο οικοδόμημα της ΕΕ, καθώς
και ότι οι συζητήσεις για αλλαγή του μείγματος που προωθείται στην ΕΕ
βρίσκονται σε φιλολαϊκή κατεύθυνση.
Θυμίζουμε ότι ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ συστηματικά
προσπάθησε να πείσει ότι το πρόβλημα δεν είναι η ΕΕ και ο καπιταλιστικός δρόμος
ανάπτυξης, αλλά η «νεοφιλελεύθερη διαχείριση», κατηγορώντας μάλιστα την
προηγούμενη κυβέρνηση ότι συνηγορεί στην παραβίαση των κανόνων, των αρχών της
ΕΕ που επιχειρούν οι ηγετικοί κύκλοι, με επικεφαλής τη Γερμανία.
Η προσπάθειά του, να καλλιεργήσει φρούδες
ελπίδες, καταρρέει σαν χάρτινος πύργος από τις πρώτες κιόλας μέρες της
συγκυβέρνησης με τους ΑΝΕΛ και κατά τη διάρκεια των εξελισσόμενων
διαπραγματεύσεων στην ΕΕ.
Η αποδοχή των δεσμεύσεων στην ΕΕ, των
Συνθηκών και των κανόνων της σημαίνει εκ προοιμίου ότι κάθε διαπραγμάτευση σε
αυτό το πλαίσιο δεν μπορεί να φύγει έξω από τα στενά αντιλαϊκά όρια που
καθορίζουν μια στρατηγική επεξεργασμένη για λογαριασμό του κεφαλαίου, μια
διαπραγμάτευση που γίνεται ακριβώς με κριτήριο τα συμφέροντα του κεφαλαίου, των
μεγάλων επιχειρηματικών ομίλων.
Εντός της ΕΕ δεν μπορεί να γίνει αλλιώς.
Μπορεί τα παζάρια στις απανωτές συνεδριάσεις του Γιούρογκρουπ να δίνουν και να
παίρνουν, μπορεί η κυβέρνηση να κομπάζει πως διαπραγματεύεται ως «ισότιμος
εταίρος» για το συμφέρον του λαού, η ουσία όμως παραμένει ίδια:
Κάθε κυβέρνηση διαπραγματεύεται για τα
συμφέροντα της δικής της αστικής τάξης, ανταγωνιστικά προς τα συμφέροντα των
άλλων. Με αυτό το κριτήριο διαμορφώνονται οι ιδιαίτερες συμμαχίες στο εσωτερικό
της ΕΕ, αλλά και οι κόντρες και αντιπαραθέσεις και οι τυχόν συμβιβασμοί.
Δεν μπαίνουν, δηλαδή, στη ζυγαριά τα
συμφέροντα των λαών, αλλά τα συμφέροντα των επιχειρηματικών ομίλων και είναι
καθαρό ότι αυτή γέρνει πάντα προς το μέρος του ισχυρότερου πολιτικά και
οικονομικά κράτους. Δεν μπορεί να γίνει αλλιώς στο καθεστώς της ανισόμετρης
οικονομικής ανάπτυξης που χαρακτηρίζει τον καπιταλισμό.
Επίσης, δεν υπάρχουν φιλίες, αλλά
λυκοφιλίες. Ανάμεσα σε ανταγωνιζόμενα μεγάλα επιχειρηματικά συμφέροντα που
εκπροσωπούνται από τα κράτη δεν μπορούν να υπάρξουν φιλίες ούτε αλληλεγγύη.
Ενώνονται μόνο απέναντι στον κοινό τους αντίπαλο, την εργατική τάξη και τα
λαϊκά στρώματα, μόνο για την ενίσχυση των αντιλαϊκών στρατηγικών, των
αντιλαϊκών θεσμών τους.
Μέσα σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, οι διακηρύξεις περί
«ισότιμης σχέσης με τους εταίρους», για «Ευρωπαϊκή Ενωση της αλληλεγγύης»,
ακόμα και για «συμμαχία των χωρών του Νότου», που θα έσωζε τάχα τους λαούς τους
από τα δεινά της λιτότητας, ακούγονται σήμερα σχεδόν αστείες.
Να γιατί ο λαός θα κυνηγάει χίμαιρες όσο
αναζητά ανακούφιση και λύση στα προβλήματά του μέσα στην ΕΕ, με την ελπίδα ότι
αυτή μπορεί να γίνει φιλολαϊκή, να αλλάξει προς όφελός του, όπως του λένε ο
ΣΥΡΙΖΑ και άλλοι. Οσο θα αποδέχεται ως μονόδρομο τη συμμετοχή της χώρας του
στις ιμπεριαλιστικές συμμαχίες, ως λύση για αυτόν τη διεκδίκηση αναβάθμισης του
ρόλου της δικιάς του αστικής τάξης.
Γι' αυτό ο λαός δεν πρέπει να στρατεύεται
πίσω από τους επιχειρηματικούς ομίλους και τα ιμπεριαλιστικά κέντρα στους
συμβιβασμούς και τις συγκρούσεις τους.
Διέξοδος για το λαό μπορεί να υπάρξει μόνο
με αγώνες που αμφισβητούν και συγκρούονται με τη στρατηγική της ΕΕ και των
κομμάτων της. Ο δρόμος για τη λαϊκή ευημερία περνάει μέσα από την αποδέσμευση
από την ΕΕ, με λαϊκή εξουσία, κοινωνικοποίηση των μέσων παραγωγής και μονομερή
διαγραφή του χρέους. Γι' αυτήν τη διέξοδο καλεί το λαό να παλέψει το ΚΚΕ.
------------------------------------------------------
(παράρτημα) - τα περίφημα "non_paper"
11/2/2015 - YANIS VAROUFAKIS
TALK IN THE 11TH FEBRUARY 2015 EUROGROUP MEETING
Mr President, (Jeroen
Dijsselbloem)
It is a great honour for me to
join this Eurogroup meeting as finance minister in the newly elected Greek
government.
On January 25th, the
Greek people strongly mandated us to terminate the cycle of austerity that has
caused economic damage and immense social costs.
The new government led by Alexis
Tsipras has committed to bring back hope, dignity and pride to Greek citizens
and to implement a comprehensive policy agenda to deal with the roots of
Greece’s socio-economic under-performance.
For five years now, many of you
have spent endless hours discussing ways and means of dealing with yet another
episode of the endless saga that seems to be the Greek crisis.
I understand your fatigue. I
understand that Europe has had enough of Greek dramas. But believe me: The
Greek people themselves have had much more than enough of it too.
It is our aim and hope that this
meeting, and maybe one or two more, will be the last ones to feature Greece on
the agenda. My government was elected in order to stabilize, to reform, to grow
Greece and thus to take it out of the headlines and off the Eurogroup’s future
agenda.
But first things first. First,
we must earn a very precious currency without depleting an important capital
good: We must earn your trust without losing the trust of our people – of the
voters amongst which we enjoy, for now, sizeable approval ratings. For such
approval is an important capital good in Europe’s struggle to sort Greece out
and to render it stable and, indeed, normal.
In this time of change, we hear
your concerns about our government’s intentions. We need, clearly, to put them
to rest.
I am here today to convey to you
a clear message on the new government’s program and commitments to its
Eurogroup partners.
(Government Commitments)
Greece, as a member of the
Eurozone, is fully committed to find a solution jointly discussed between
partners, in order to strengthen our monetary union.
We are committed to cooperate in
good faith with all our European and international partners, on an equal
footing.
Our citizens have rejected the role of the ‘Troika’ in Greece.
Our government will however maintain dialogue and continue to cooperate fully
with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF as a member country of the European Union, the Euro Area and the Fund. Our future
cooperation should be based on mutual trust and respect and channelled
primarily through the European Commission while we work with each of our
partner institutions in their specific areas of expertise and competence.
We are committed to sound public
finances. Greece has made a vast adjustment over the past five years at immense
social cost. Its deficit is now below 3% in nominal terms, down from 15% in
2010. Its primary surplus has reached 1.5% at the end of last year, its
structural balance, as measured by the IMF, has reached a surplus of 1.6%, the
best performance in the EU.
The new government takes this
adjustment as its point of departure. We wish now to move forward, on the basis
of a new mutually beneficial partnership with our European partners.
We are committed to deep
structural reforms.
Our reform agenda aims at
re-creating confidence among Greek citizens, growth in the economy, and
credibility in Europe. It recognizes the need for deep reforms to anchor the
long-term prosperity of Greece within the Eurozone.
Our government will be the most
reform-oriented government in Greek modern history, and among the most
enthusiastic reformers in Europe. Why? Simply because we are not tied to any
interest groups. We will deliver results for the people, not for friends or
patrons.
We will not only commit to
reforms, we will deliver them.
This morning the OECD Secretary
General has agreed to assist us in this task. Your help, the Commission’s help,
the IMF’s help, will also be necessary in important areas where powerful opposing interests are entrenched and
the political challenges are especially great. We may be an inexperienced
government but we have sizeable support from a fed up population to cut through
not just red tape but also to cut through the Gordian knot of vested interests.
We stand ready to support
structural reforms previously agreed with our Eurogroup partners with regard to
tax collection, public financial management, public administration reform,
improvement of the business climate, reform of the judiciary, spatial planning
and fight against rent-seeking. They are fully consistent with our political
mandate, and we will even accelerate them.
We will take unprecedented
action to fight corruption, to fight tax evasion and ensure tax enforceability,
with an emphasis on transfer pricing in large corporates active abroad.
We want to discuss legislative
proposals to reinforce the legal framework for an independent tax authority.
Technical assistance from you on
these issues will be critical, not least because it will enhance trust between
us and you.
A full legislative package will
create favourable conditions for the economy, improve the business climate and
undermine rent-seeking, in particular in the oil sector, procurement, the
construction sector, the financial sector, and the media.
We will make public procurement
procedures more transparent thanks to a more centralized system, efficient
monitoring and e-procurement.
We will improve the overall
efficiency of the public sector to increase the quality of services delivered
to every citizen and tackle administrative burden.
In addition, we will propose a
new set of home-grown reforms to support investment, restart growth, and
improve economic efficiency.
Investment should be revived, in
Greece and in the whole Europe.
We want to revive infrastructure
projects with public and private investors and the support of the EU. Indeed,
we have some innovative ideas of our own that may help mobilize idle savings
into productive investments throughout the Continent, in support of the current
efforts of the Commission to enhance investment and of the European Central
Bank to stem deflationary forces.
Returning to Greece, we want to
invest to reduce energy costs for medium and large scale industries, to support
innovation, start-ups and to promote a shift towards sectors with comparative
advantages and export potential such as pharmaceuticals, organic agriculture,
light manufacturing, energy resources, with the emphasis naturally on
renewables.
On
privatization and the development of publicly owned assets, the government is
utterly undogmatic; we are ready and willing to
evaluate each and every one project on its merits alone. Media reports that the
Pireus port privatisation was reversed could not be further from the truth.
Indeed, quite the opposite holds as foreign direct investment will be
encouraged as long as the state secures a stream of long term revenues and a
say in labour relations and environmental issues.
Quick fire sales of public
property, at a time when asset prices are deeply depressed, is not something
that anyone would advocate.
Instead, the government will create a development bank which will incorporate state assets, enhance
their equity value through reforming property rights and use them as collateral
for the purposes of providing, in association with European investment
institutions such as the European Investment Banks, funding to the Greek
private sector.
We want to take additional
measures to clean-up non-performing loans in the banking sector to render the
banks able to support SMEs and households.
Several misleading reports have
caused misunderstandings with our partners by insinuating that we have rolled
back previous reforms and added to our state budget. On the contrary, the
measures announced by the Prime Minister with respect to rehiring tax office cleaners,
school guards and the staff of the public broadcasting network: (1) have no
adverse effect on competitiveness and (2) have no fiscal bearing as they will
be paid for entirely by other savings in the state budget. For example, the
wrongfully dismissed staff that will be rehired number 2013 people, a tiny
number that must be juxtaposed against the 15 thousand hirings that are already
inscribed in the 2015 budget that the previous government passed.
On two other emotive topics, let
me clarify that the restoration of the pension cuts we announced concern
pensioners living at or below the poverty line and comes up to less than 2
euros per day per eligible pensioner – at a grand total of around 9.5 million.
The reason we made this announcement is one that I shall return to, as I must,
during our discussions: The appalling humanitarian crisis caused by the
debt-deflation.
On the minimum wage, the
government will phase in its restoration to the 2012 level gradually, from
September onwards and after consultation with employers and trades unions. As
it applies only to the private sector, its fiscal impact will be, if anything,
quite positive, as its multiplier effect is large and likely to boost tax
revenues beyond the affected employees. Will it reduce competitiveness of the
private sector? The government commits to reforms, e.g. in social security,
reducing the tax wage that will ensure it does not.
(A New Partnership)
The new partnership we propose
to you should be based on realistic goals and efficient policies.
We recognize that the previous
adjustment program reflected commitments made by both Greece and its Eurogroup
partners.
We recognize the tremendous
efforts made by your countries’ taxpayers to support Greece’s debt and maintain
the integrity of the euro.
However, unrealistic,
self-defeating fiscal targets have been imposed on our country and population
and hence must be revised. A primary surplus target of 4.5% of GDP
year-in-year-out has no historical precedent in any situation resembling that of
Greece today. It will simply not be possible for our country to grow if we
remain on the growth sapping austerity path imposed on our economy. It is also
quite inconsistent with achieving a sustainably reduced debt-to-GDP ratio.
The new contract we propose to
discuss with you should recognize this evidence.
Continued primary surpluses will
remain our mantra. We propose a maximum 1.5% of GDP primary surplus objective,
from as soon as the present disturbed economic situation has stabilized and for
as long as necessary to achieve the underlying goals. This objective can be
shown to be sufficient, under very reasonable assumptions, to put the debt
trajectory on a downward path.
The new contract will build upon
reforms that are ‘owned’ by citizens’ and domestic institutions, using many
elements from the previously agreed policy agenda. This also means that the
hope of shared prosperity must be revived.
We wish to discuss with you this
home-grown agenda that reflects both our potential and specific constraints. We
wish our growth to be inclusive, based on investment, and productivity gains.
Growth based on further labour cost compression cannot work in Greece and has
been rejected by our people.
Based on more realistic primary
surplus targets and our home-grown, wholly owned, reform and growth agenda, the
new contract we propose will restore a sustainable debt trajectory.
We invite the IMF to work with
us to assess Greek debt sustainability building on the government’s
commitments. This new DSA should reflect the concessional features of Greek
debt due to its very long maturity and low interest charge.
It is probable however that
additional measures will be required to ensure Greece’s capacity to re-access
the financial markets.
Eurogroup committed in November
2012 to tackle this issue once Greece would post primary surpluses, which was
the case in 2014 and will be the case in 2015 once the current situation
stabilizes. This discussion should be reopened when we will discuss our new
contract.
Greece will stand ready to make
concrete proposals to its partners, in due time, on a menu of innovative
instruments to reduce the debt burden efficiently, including debt swaps.
Moreover, we believe that a
broader discussion on debt issues in Europe is necessary. We welcome Mr
Dijsselbloem’s recent statement in our joint press conference in Athens that
the Eurogroup is the proper forum to act as a permanent European debt
conference, addressing debt problems in Euro area member States. We therefore
propose to create a specific Eurogroup working group gathering member states’
representatives and experts.
(A Bridge Program)
Agreeing on a new policy
framework between Greece and its Eurogroup and international partners will take
some time.
In the meantime, covering
Greece’s financing needs over the next months is an immediate concern for all
of us.
Until June, Greece faces €5.2bn
payments to the IMF: our government is fully committed to honor these payments,
possibly directly to the IMF.
To meet our immediate payment
obligations, we ask the Eurogroup to disburse to Greece the outstanding €1.9bn
SMP bond-related Eurosystem income, in accordance with its previous
commitments. We are, in fact, open to the idea that the ECB transfers these
funds directly to the IMF in lieu of Greece’ outstanding repayments.
Moreover, we propose to work
urgently on a bridge financing mechanism to ensure Greece’s liquidity position
over the coming months.
In July and August, €6.7bn
repayments are scheduled to the ECB (as the holder of SMP bonds), on top of
additional payments to the IMF. These payments create very exceptional pressure
on Greece’s funding needs in 2015.
We are confident that an
agreement can be reached before the summer, notably with the IMF’s input, that
would provide solutions and funding sources to cover these needs.
(Technical Extension)
Let me conclude now on the
technical and legal issues concerning the existing loan agreement.
We fully understand that the
dates associated with the existing loan agreement must be moved forward in
order to provide stability, to give time to the discussions, and allow for the
disbursement of SMP bond-related funds and possibly other funds. We remind you
that the present deadline of 28/2/2015 are entirely artificial, and were the
product of the previous government's electoral strategy and desire to confront
us with these difficulties on taking office. It is time, in good faith, for
these maneuvers to stop and for serious work to begin.
We stand ready to ask for a
revision of these dates in view of the next scheduled Eurogroup meeting next
Monday the 16th of February 2015.
However, let me be very clear on
this: the government asks for this revision of dates on the condition that it
is the starting point for genuine negotiations in good faith for forging a
different contract between us, based a realistic primary surplus effort and
efficient as well as socially just structural policies – including of course
many elements of the previous program that we accept. We need assurances on this
point.
We can accept this revision of
dates as a “bridge” towards a new partnership and a necessary condition for the
discussion. However, such an extension cannot be taken as acquiescence to the
logic and parts of the former agenda that have been rejected by our people.
We propose the bridge program to
cover the period until end-August. This will provide sufficient time to agree
on the terms of our partnership. A partnership that will bind our side to deep
reform but also acknowledge and address Greece’s hideous humanitarian crisis,
the non-availability of credit even for profitable firms, and the urgent need
for investment-led growth.
Dear Colleagues,
Europe is whole and indivisible,
and the government of Greece considers that Greece is a permanent and
inseparable member of the European Union and our monetary union.
Surely there are various ways to
foster policies that will truly nurture and enhance economic growth, maintain
fiscal and financial stability, and address the most pressing needs of the
people.
Some of you, I know, were
displeased by the victory of a leftwing, a radical leftwing, party. To them I
have this to say: It would be a lost opportunity to see us as adversaries.
We are dedicated Europeanists.
We care about our people deeply but we are not populists promising all things
to all people. Moreover, we can carry the Greek people along an agreement that
is genuinely beneficial to the average European. In us you will find
trustworthy partners who do not see these meetings as a means of extracting
something out of nothing, of gaining at anyone’s expense.
I look forward to discuss with
you now, in a true spirit of cooperation and partnership, and to write together
this new page of our relationship.
I thank you very much for your
attention.
-------------------------------------------------------------
EUROGROUP MEETING – FEBRUARY 11, 2015 – BRUSSELS
NON-PAPER FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
On January 25th, Greek citizens sent an unequivocal signal of change and
endorsement of the new social contract for political stability and economic
security proposed by SYRIZA.
The new government is committed to implement policies that will deeply
reform Greece’s social economy, reduce rent-seeking, anchor euro membership and
reflect the will of the Greek people. These policies will address the
humanitarian crisis, enhance social cohesion, restore justice and dignity, put
the Greek population back on its feet and restore economic growth.
The government knows that improving citizens’ daily lives requires
macroeconomic, fiscal and financial stability. As such, the Greek authorities
intend to maintain sound public finances and to preserve financial sector
stability. They stand ready to commit to realistic and reasonable quantitative
targets in that regard.
There is a way to foster policies that will restore growth and maintain
fiscal stability, while addressing the
most pressing needs of the people. These policies should be part of a new agreement between Greece and its Eurogroup
partners that focus on economic development, investment, social conditions and
improved public management.
Greece has made an extraordinary adjustment over the course of the past
five years. Its deficit is now below 3% of GDP, down from 15% in 2010. Its
primary surplus has reached 1.5%, its structural balance, adjusting for the
output gap as measured by the IMF, has reached a surplus of 1.6%, one of the
highest in Europe.
The new government takes this adjustment as its starting point. The task
now is to stabilize the Greek economy and society, which has paid an immense
and unsustainable price, and this requires changes to the previous policies.
However, agreeing on a new policy framework between Greece and its partners will take time. The government
proposes to its Eurogroup partners to agree immediately on a bridge and
stabilization program for the next
seven months (e.g. up to end-August),
with a 90 day-period for negotiations on the terms at the beginning. These will
provide the appropriate time-frames to agree on and to begin to implement
policies that will repair society, restore confidence, and support growth and
development in Greece.
Greek Government Policy Objectives & Commitments
The government is ready to commit to the following:
1. Sound and Sustainable Public Finances
The government commits to
maintain a 1.5% primary fiscal surplus in 2015, when the domestic situation has
stabilized, and to maintain that objective until such time as normal conditions
are restored and the debt ratio is on a clear downward path.
To meet this objective, the government will refrain from spending
measures that might derail the budget target and it will increase efforts to
improve tax collection. Increases in
spending will focus on investments financed by the European Investment Bank and
other outside sources, and on measures addressing the humanitarian crisis
including a food stamps program, minimum electricity and heating and basic
transport. Insofar as these must rely on domestic resources they will be
balanced by additional revenues or offsetting spending reductions, as required
to maintain the fiscal objectives.
Unrealistic fiscal targets are self defeating and must be revised. The
primary surplus target of 4.5% of GDP over the medium term and 4% over the
long-term was entirely artificial, has no historical precedent resembling Greece’s
circumstances, and has essentially no support from among reputable economists.
In practice pursuit of such a target is also unsustainable, and the goal of
putting debt-to-GDP on a clear downward path requires that it be revised.
Uncertainties surrounding the electoral period in Greece and the
ultimate status of Greece with respect to Europe have affected economic
activity and fiscal performance over the last two months. As a first step, it is essential to stabilize
the banking system immediately and to restore confidence in Greece as a full
and permanent member of the Eurozone. The Government of Greece requests
immediate affirmation and assistance from its Eurogroup partners to this end.
2. Maintaining Financial Sector Stability
The stability of the Greek financial sector is of utmost importance to
the government and an immediate concern
for the Euro Area as a whole.
Following the ECB Governing Council’s decision on Feb. 4th, Greek banks
will remain fully secured as they rely on Bank of Greece’s Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA).
The government expects that an agreement with its Eurogroup partners on
a bridge program will allow the Governing Council to renew the waiver for
eligibility of Greek paper to Eurosystem refinancing operations.
In the medium term, additional action is required to support further the
banking sector. The government would like to discuss with its partners the
mobilization of remaining unspent resources available to the Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund (app. EUR 8 billion) to further strengthen the banking system. The
government stands ready to make a concrete proposal on how the remaining HFSF
assets could be used to clean out the banks from their NPLs. Moreover, HFSF
management should be made more transparent and efficient.
3. Addressing Immediate Financing Needs
Covering gross financing needs in an immediate concern for the Greek
authorities.
Before June, Greece faces €5.2bn repayments to the IMF. The government
is fully committed to honor these payments. The government looks forward to a
positive discussion with the IMF on renewing a financing agreement based on an
updated DSA.
To meet its immediate payment obligations, the government asks the
Eurogroup to disburse to Greece the outstanding €1.9bn SMP bonds related
Eurosystem income, in accordance with Eurogroup previous commitments. After
June, €6.7bn repayments are scheduled over the summer to the ECB as the holder
of SMP bonds. This repayment creates very exceptional pressure on Greece’s
funding needs in 2015.
The government expects that an agreement regarding the issuance of
T-bills will be obtained to cover these exceptional needs. This would not raise
the amount of debt, but only change its composition.
4. Debt Sustainability
Restoring debt sustainability is a key policy objective for the Greek
authorities.
Additional measures will be required to restore Greece’s long-term
solvency and to ensure its capacity to borrow in the financial markets at
reasonable cost in the near future. Eurogroup committed in
November 2012 to tackle this issue once Greece would post primary
surpluses, which was the case in 2014 and will be the case in 2015.
IMF technical staff should work closely with the Greek team to assist in
developing a sustainable debt program, taking full account of the experience of
the recent past. Buttressed with
quantifiable targets audited by unconflicted parties, such an arrangement could
form the type of covenant that the government
and the EU partners and bilateral lenders can accept.
In that framework, the authorities are ready to open discussion on
options that would bring Greece the necessary breathing space and ultimately
the means to restore access to financial markets. These options would be part
of the “new deal” to be sealed between Greece and its partners. They would be
fully consistent with (i) the new more realistic fiscal framework to be
agreed; (ii) an updated IMF Debt
Sustainability Analysis taking stock of these new assumptions, and (iii) a
positive program for growth and social development to which the government and
the Greek people are firmly committed.
Greece is ready to make concrete proposals to its partners, in due time,
on a menu of instruments to reduce the debt burden efficiently, including debt
swaps.
5. The New Reform Agenda
The Greek Government is working on a new agenda for growth and
structural reforms. The new agenda will address the causes of Greek economic
decline and help to modernize the Greek socioeconomic model.
The government undertakes to reduce tax evasion, tax immunity, smuggling,
cartelsand rent-seeking. Reforms will improve the enforcement of income tax,
VAT, and social contributions, and fight tax evasion with an emphasis on
transfer pricing in large corporates active abroad. The government stands ready
to discuss legislative proposals to reinforce the legal framework for an
independent tax authority within the Ministry of Finance.
A full legislative package will
improve the business climate and
undermine rent-seekers, in particular in the oil sector, the financial sector,
and the media. Public procurement procedures will be made more transparent and
fair thanks to a more centralized system, efficient monitoring and
e-procurement. Reforms will increase the overall efficiency of the public sector,
with an objective to improve the quality of services delivered to every
citizen. Policies undermining social cohesion have failed and will be dropped.
Foreign investors remain welcome and the government will support their
investments in Greece. On privatization
and the development of public assets, the government is ready and willing to
evaluate each and every project on its merits alone.
To boost domestic investment and support economic recovery, the
government will create a national development bank, to which various public
assets will be transferred, and to support the SMEs. The national development
bank will play a leading role in channeling EIB loans allocated to private
projects in Greece.
The Greek authorities have asked the Secretary General of the OECD, who
has accepted, for technical assistance in devising, implementing and monitoring
this new reform agenda.
7. A New Contract for the New Agenda
This new agenda will give impetus to many of the policy actions listed
in the policy program previously agreed between Greece and its Eurogroup
partners, including tax policy, revenue administration, public financial
management, public administration effectiveness, collection of social
contributions, promotion of business investment, spatial management and
planning, and reform of the judicial system.
Over the bridge period during which this new contract will be prepared
and negotiated, the government will put a priority on the implementation of
those actions listed in the existing agreements that are fully consistent with
its political mandate. Altogether, they would represent more than 70% of the
whole list of previously-agreed actions. New initiatives announced by the
government will be programmed to take effect after the completion of successful
negotiations.
8. Conclusion
Europe is whole and indivisible, and the government of Greece considers
that Greece is a permanent and inseparable member of the European Union and the
Eurogroup. The government is committed to a relationship between Greece and its
partners based on good faith, mutual trust, and a common commitment to the
European project. It is confident that a relationship firmly built on this
basis can work to restore the Greek economy and to anchor Greece’s future as a
prosperous member of the Euro Area.
--------------------------------
16/2/2015 - YANIS VAROUFAKIS TALK IN THE 16TH FEBRUARY 2015
EUROGROUP MEETING
Mr President,
Dear colleagues,
This government’s task is to
carry out the deep reforms that Greece needs to arrest the combined forces of
deflation and negative debt dynamics, bring about investment-led recovery and,
thus, maximise the net present value of our debt repayments to our creditors.
The Greek government fully
respects its commitments to our partners and to the institutions that we are
party to. Our difficulty in declaring a commitment to the current program, and
to its “successful conclusion”, is that in our estimation this program was not
conducive to recovery and, thus, inherently impossible to conclude
successfully.
To many, our reluctance to
accept the phrase “extend the current program and successfully complete it”
stems from the determination of this government never to issue a promise that
it cannot keep. We fear that if we accept the priorities, the matrix, of the
current program, and only work within its overarching logic, even if we change
some aspects of it, I fear that we shall be giving the debt-deflationary spiral
another boost, we shall lose our people’s support, and, as a result, the
country will be very hard to reform henceforth. As a recently appointed finance
minister of a country that has a credibility deficit in this room, I trust that
you will understand my reluctance to promise that which I do not believe I can
deliver.
Nevertheless, there is much that
we can deliver that is of mutual benefit. To do so, we need a short-term (three
to six month long) agreement that will allow us to establish the “common
ground” mentioned by President JD and Prime Minister AT last Thursday. It is in
no one’s interest if, over the next days and weeks, as a result of a political
failure on our part Greece languishes under a collapse in activity, a collapse
in revenue and continued deposit outflows.
We need an in-principle
agreement that during this period the Greek state will be funded under a minimalist
menu that solves the short term cash flow problem (e.g. transfer to the IMF, in
lieu of Greece’s repayments, of the €1.9 billion that the Greek government is
due from the ECB ‘profit’-rebate agreement; a flexible ELA, a rise in the
artificial cap of T-bill issues etc.) and commits the Greek government to a
number of conditionalities:
·
The Greek government
reiterates its commitment to the terms of its loan agreement to all our
creditors
·
The Greek government
takes no action that threatens to derail the existing budget framework or that
has implications for financial stability
·
The Greek government
will take no action toward a haircut of its loans’ face value
The Greek government is deeply
concerned about the deleterious effects of non-performing loans on the capacity
of Greece’s private banks to extend credit to firms and households and is,
thus, keen to find means, utilising the unused capacity of the HFSF to cleanse
them. Similarly, we are eager to find ways of writing off the accumulated
penalties on taxpayers in arrears that have mounted up to €70 billion.
Naturally, the Greek administration understands that any such write offs must
be designed to avoid rewarding strategic defaulters and, most certainly, to
prevent a long term tendency to delay paying debts and taxes. Still, we think
that the backlog of arrears and NPLs are a major impediment to recovery. To
this end, we shall seek the advice of our partners before legislating
appropriately.
In exchange of the above
commitment that the Greek government is prepared to give during the period of
the extension/bridge, our partners ought to agree that, during the same period:
·
There will be no
measures that we consider recessionary such as pension cuts or VAT hikes.
Regarding the specifics of the
short term financing, or of the above conditionalities, we believe that these
technical issues can be resolved within a day or two, as long as the political
will is present. In any case, let me remind you that we are talking about a
short space of a few months of stability that is necessary to establish the
parameters of the longer term framework within which Greece and Europe and the
IMF will establish so as to put Greece on a sustainable path.
The Greek authorities are
determined to use these few months effectively, as opposed simply to buying
time for the purpose of doing little. We propose to concentrate on a few
reforms that are essential and which can be implemented immediately, with the
assistance of the institutions plus of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development. Among them, we intend to:
·
Cut the Gordian Knot
of bureaucracy - through legislation that bans public sector departments from
asking of citizens or business information, certificates or documents that the
state possesses already (and which reside in some other department)
·
Tax authority
reforms towards greater independence, propriety and transparency
·
Create an efficient
and fair tax court system
·
Modern bankruptcy
system
·
Judicial system
reforms, in general
·
Creating a
competitive and sound electronic media environment that enhances transparency
and yields tax revenues for the state
·
Dismantle the
various cartels
Ladies and gentlemen, dear
colleagues,
Unlike previous governments we
shall not make promises which we know we cannot fulfil. I could, for instance,
placate everyone by accepting for example the €5 billion privatisation target,
so as to reach agreement. But I know that I cannot deliver. Just like previous
governments could not deliver in a marketplace of collapsing asset prices.
Similarly with foreclosures of
non-performing mortgages. Independently of our ideological differences (and
whether you agree with our government that family homes should not be auctioned
off in the midst of a depression on ethical grounds), the fact remains that it
would be non-sensical to throw hundreds of thousands of families on the street
at a time when there are no buyers and, as a result, such foreclosures will
yield no capital for the banks, will fuel the already hideous humanitarian
crisis and, in the end, destroy what is left of the real estate market.
To recap, our government is
ready and willing to apply for an extension of our loan agreement till the end
of August (or any other duration that Eurogroup may deem fit), to agree on a
number of sensible conditionalities for the duration of this period and to
commit to having a full review complete by the European Commission at the end
of this interim period – a period that will allow Greece and its partners to
design together a new Contract for Greece’s Prosperity and Growth.
I trust that, despite any
differences, our common ground is solid and such that we can build upon it a
mutually beneficial agreement in the spirit of true European collegiality.
EUROGROUP MEETING – FEBRUARY 16, 2015 – BRUSSELS
NON-PAPER FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
1.
Outcome of Technical Discussions
Technical discussion took place
on Feb. 13-14 between Greek officials and representatives from the EU
Commission, the ECB and the IMF to identify common ground between the two
parties and discuss the content of the current MoU.
On structural reforms, good
progress was made to identify areas where the Greek authorities can support the
ongoing reform agenda: tax reform, revenue administration reform, public
financial management, fighting corruption, e-government, public procurement
reform, business climate improvement, judicial system reform, implementation of
EU legislation on network industries and competitive sectors.
Time is needed over the coming
weeks for the new government to make a more detailed assessment of ongoing
reforms. The Greek government is fully committed to continue efforts made in
these areas. It considers as an essential part of its political mandate to
accelerate implementation of decisive policy actions the previous government
failed to implement: decisively confronting tax evaders, fighting corruption
and reforming public administration. It stands ready to commit to the
short-term implementation of key policy actions.
Technical discussions revealed
real differences of logic on a limited number of issues. The Greek government
considers current labor market reform agenda as unfit to the current situation
of the economy. It will promote a different approach, with technical assistance
from ILO, to ensure workers’ protection in a way that is consistent with
economic growth.
The government will also promote
a different approach for managing public assets. Privatizations will not be
stopped but assessed on a case by case basis to ensure that they are consistent
with public interest. Fire sales must be prevented, and a longer time horizon,
in particular with respect to the banking sector, must be considered.
On public administration reform,
the government supports the goals to make SoEs more efficient and establish a
more efficient civil service but systematic dismissals will end. On taxation,
the government will review current policies to protect the poorest segments of
the population. It will review the brackets for income tax to increase
progressivity and replace the current property tax by a wealth tax. VAT reform
will be reviewed.
Finally, the Greek authorities
identified some areas where there is a general agreement on broad objectives
but where they would like to discuss new ideas to meet the policy goals of the
MoU. On banking sector reform, the authorities would like to discuss the
creation of an Asset Management Company to address NPLs. To support investment,
the government considers a priority to develop the social sector and create a
public development bank.
On this basis, the Greek
authorities consider that there exists sufficient common grounds to
constructively discuss with its European partners, on the basis of fresh views
and a forward looking approach, the terms of a new commonly agreed policy
agenda that will fully encapsulate the government’s views. The government is
committed to continue a reform agenda which takes the best elements of the
current program and of its own reform agenda. These discussions should be held
in an appropriate format that builds on the ECB’s and EU Commission’s specific
mandates.
2.
Debt sustainability
The Greek authorities are
committed to continued primary surpluses over the next decade to ensure sound
publics finances. However, implementing the primary surplus targets envisaged
by the MoU would be counterproductive. A 3% primary surplus in 2015 and 4.5% in
2016 would jeopardize the current fragile recovery. Moreover, it is not at all
necessary to put the debt on a steady declining path. A 4.5% primary surplus
would lead, according to our projections, to extinguish entirely the debt by
2050. This is not the standard definition of debt sustainability.
The current program sets the
objective of a 124% nominal debt-to-GDP ratio in 2020 to ensure sustainability
and full market-access in 2023 when large maturities will have to be
refinanced. The authorities consider this target as artificial and
inappropriate. As stated by the Director General of the ESM in 2013, the
structure of the Greek debt is as important as the debt-to-GDP ratio to assess
sustainability. Long term maturities and reduced interest rates already entail
a lower debt ratio in 2015 in net present value terms. In NPV terms, the debt
stands at 135% of GDP and would fall below the bar of 120% if the same 1,5%
primary surplus as in 2014 was achieved. The government looks forward to
discuss with the IMF and the other institutions a more accurate assessment of
debt sustainability.
Privatization receipts can
contribute to improve the debt trajectory. However, past commitments made by
the previous Greek government fell short of the targets. Quantitative
objectives should be realistic. Forcing sales of public assets in a depressed
environment is unjustified. The authorities will stop all sales that are not in
the public interest.
3.
Covering Funding Needs in 2015
Funding needs in the year 2015
and over the coming months is a pressing and immediate concern.
Budget Balance
On the revenue side, the previous period was dominated by political
interventions, of varying intensity and from numerous sources that promoted
uncertainty and thus affected economic activity and tax collection. Revenue shortfall as of end-January reached €2 billion compared to MoF
forecast.
The authorities contemplate
exceptional action in terms of revenue mobilization in 2015. Up to €5.5bn are
expected over the year thanks to a strong effort to (i) fight illegal trading,
tax evasion and corruption (ii) better control transfer pricing in companies
active abroad (iii) reform arrears collection process and (iv) implement a more
progressive taxation on the wealthiest.
The authorities will look
forward to maintain a 1.5% primary surplus over the year. This objective
depends on economic stabilization. New spending (humanitarian package) will be
financed through reprioritization of expenditures and cuts in other budgetary
items.
Debt Amortization
Greece faces exceptional funding
needs in 2015. Payments to the IMF as well as to the ECB and other creditors
will amount to c. €17bn over the year.
Budget deficit itself, in cash
term, will not add much to this figure, especially if the SMP profits are
incorporated in the government resources.
To cover all its refinancing
needs, the government proposes to open discussions with its European partners
on the terms of a new contract that will provide the appropriate framework for
continued support from the ECB and Member States. Technical work conducted with
the three partner institutions demonstrated that there is room for a new deal.
The government is confident that a fresh look at DSA will demonstrate that the
objectives of the government are on target. Once an agreement is reached on the
desired pattern of fiscal adjustment, the Greek government believes a holistic
agreement will be on reach on structural reforms.
Short Term Bridge Funding
To solve short run liquidity
problems, the government foresees an agreement on a combined involvement of the
Eurosystem and its ELA program (in relation to the issuance of T-bills), of the
IMF through new disbursements and of the Eurogroup for allowing the release of
the unused HFSF resources.
We are confident that such an agreement can be reached on the basis of
the sufficient common grounds identified with the three institutions on the
content of the current MoU.
Annex 1: Privatization Receipts
The expected cumulative
privatization proceeds are expected to reach €22.3bn by 2020 according to the
IMF. However, the Greek authorities consider this target unrealistic.
Privatization Receipts have fallen Short of Expectations since 2011
In 2011, under the first
program, the MoU agreed with the Eurogroup expected €50 billion of
privatization receipts over the period 2011-2016, with a €5bn target for 2011,
€10bn for 2012 and €5bn in 2013 (€20bn total receipts at the end of 2013 and
€35bn at the end of 2014).
In 2012, the second MoU stated
that the €50bn target was maintained, but over a much longer time horizon. The
end-2020 target was revised down to €22bn in April 2014 considering the
“unsatisfactory privatization process”.
In practice, privatization
proceeds amounted to €1.6bn in 2011, zero in 2012, 1bn in 2013 and were
expected to reach 1.5bn in 2014 and 2.2bn in 2015.
These figures demonstrate the
practical inability of privatizations to bring sizeable resources to repay public
debt in the current Greek context.
The New Government’s Intentions
The intentions of the new
Government to halt the systematic approach to privatizations will result in a
shortfall over the short and medium run, but could ultimately produce higher
proceeds over the long run by avoiding fire sales and/or asset disposals that
are not in the interest of the Greek people.
This new attitude will
inevitably deteriorate the debt sustainability over the short run and prevent
Greece to reach the arbitrary target of 124% of nominal debt to GDP ratio by
2020, but it will with no doubt contribute to improve the debt trajectory over
the longer run.
Regarding financing needs,
privatization receipts for the year 2015 were estimated at €2,2bn by the IMF.
The distribution of SMP profits for 2014 (€1,9bn) would allow to make up for
most of this shortfall.
Annex 2: Debt Sustainability
Debt
sustainability is about keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio under control. This
typically requires that the deficit is low enough to guarantee that the debt
ratio is falling rather than rising. To compute this threshold one needs to
make assumptions on growth. An economy with zero (nominal) growth needs a
balanced budget. With positive growth, some deficit is consistent with solvency;
all it takes is for the debt to grow less rapidly than GDP.
In the
case of Greece, with a debt-to-GDP ratio at 175%, the deficit that would
stabilize the debt to GDP ratio at its current level is 7% of GDP (=4%*1.75)
assuming a conservative growth of 4% in nominal term. Greece has already better
performed since in 2014, the deficit fell under the Maastricht benchmark of 3%.
In structural terms, correcting the measure of the deficit for the output gap,
Greece is actually engineering a fiscal surplus of 1.6% of GDP (according to
IMF).
In other
words, a 3% deficit is well within the boundaries of sustainability as
conventionally defined. Given the interest bill, of about 3% of GDP today and
potentially of 4.5% in the future (once the interest deferral on EFSF loans
expires), a primary surplus of 1.5% is up to the task.
The
attached simulation shows the downward debt trajectory until 2054 assuming a
constant 1.5% of GDP primary surplus.
Discussion
with the IMF over such DSA-style discussions would be critical. The 4.5%
primary target is only required to bring debt below an arbitrary threshold of
124% by 2020 (according to the latest DSA) and below 120% in 2022. However, the
IMF does not take into account the adverse consequences on growth of the
austerity shock that is required to meet this fiscal target. Yet, GDP growth is
as important, and even more important, than the primary surplus to reduce the
debt to GDP ratio. Besides, any attempt to further
squeeze the budget in the current context of humanitarian crisis and slight
resurgence of economic growth would have a disastrous impact on both the
economic and social fronts.
A Misunderstanding
The
misunderstanding regarding Greece solvency owes to the fact that the blunt 175%
Debt-to-GDP number does not fully describe the actual burden of public debt
over the Greek economy.
Greece
currently owes the EFSF c. €142bn (75% of 2015 IMF projected GDP), bearing an
interest rate of c. 2.5%, and having a final maturity of 39yrs (amortizing from
year 2023 until year 2054). This high level of concessionality of the EFSF
loans is not captured in the nominal debt/GDP ratio used by the IMF in
the case of Greece. The same analysis can be made for GLF loans (interest rate
at 50bp above Euribor, i.e. currently 0.65%, and final maturity 2041).
In an
interview in September 2013, head of ESM Klaus Regling strikingly stated that
DSA analyses undertaken by the IMF are “meaningless”. A key argument from
Regling is that the debt parameters are as important to assess debt
sustainability as the debt nominal level itself: EFSF loans are very long term,
with very concessional interest rate
reduced to EFSF funding cost of approximately 2% plus an operational margin
cost of c. 50bp.
Indeed, if Greece’s debt was calculated in NPV terms, say with a 5%
discount factor, the Debt-to-GDP ratio would already be as low as 133% of GDP
(see below), and reach 127% in 2020 (as expected by the IMF in nominal term)
with a primary surplus maintained at 1.5% of GDP instead of 4.5%.
We show below the debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics under the assumption of a
primary surplus maintained at 1.5% and conservative assumptions of nominal
growth at 4% (below IMF expectations).
Under this set of assumptions, the NPV of Public debt reaches 120% of
GDP in 2020.
We show below the same dynamics
under the assumption of a long term primary surplus of 4% as requested by the
EU. Under these unjustified assumptions, the debt would dramatically decrease
and totally disappear within the next 30 yrs, which is not the definition of
sustainability.
PRESS CONFERENCE
STATEMENT BY YANIS VAROUFAKIS, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EUROGROUP MEETING OF 16TH
FEBRUARY 2015
I am pleased to report that the negotiations were conducted in a
collegial spirit, clearly revealing a unity of purpose – the purpose being to
establish common ground, over the next 4 to 6 months, so as to reach a
meaningful, sustainable new long term contract between Greece, official Europe
and the IMF. Moreover, I have no doubt that they will continue tomorrow and the
day after until there is an agreement.
So, if this is so, why have we not managed to agree on a communiqué, a
simple phrase, that will unlock immediately this period of deliberation?
The real reason concerns a substantial disagreement on whether the task
ahead is to complete a program that this government was elected to challenge
the logic of - or to sit down with our partners, with an open mind, and
re-think this program which, in our estimation, and in the estimation of most
clear-thinking people, has failed to stabilise Greece, has generated a major
humanitarian crisis and has made reforming Greece, which is absolutely
essential, ever so hard. Remember: a debt-deflationary spiral does not lend
itself to successful reforms, of the form that Greece needs in order to stop being
dependent on loans from its partners and from the institutions.
Last Wednesday, in the previous EG meeting, we turned down a pressing
demand to subscribe to “extending and successfully concluding the current
program”. As a result of that impasse, on the following afternoon (last
Thursday, and prior to the Summit) EG President Jeroen Dijsselbloem and
Greek PM Alexis Tsipras agreed on a joint communiqué to the effect that the two
sides would explore “common ground between the current program and the plans of
the new government for a New Contract with Europe.
It was a genuine
breakthrough, bridging over the current program and the new contract that we
are seeking with our partners.
This afternoon there
was another breakthrough. Prior to the
Eurogroup meeting, I met with Mr Moscovici, whom I want to thank for his highly
positive role in this process, who presented me with a draft communiqué (see
Annex 3 below) which, as I told him, I was happy to sign there and then – as it
recognised the humanitarian crisis, and spoke of an extension of the current
loan agreement, which could take the form of a [four-month] intermediate
programme, as a transitional stage to a new contract for growth for Greece,
that will be deliberated and concluded during this period. It also stated that
the European Commission would provide technical assistance to Greece to
strengthen and accelerate the implementation of reforms, effectively replacing
the troika.
On the basis of this understanding between us and the Commission, we
were more than happy to apply for the loan agreement to be extended, while we
offered the following conditionalities:
·
Reiterate its
commitment to the terms of its loan agreement to all our creditors
·
Take no action that
threatens to derail the existing budget framework or that has implications for
financial stability
Our only condition for the other
side was that we should not be asked to impose measures that are recessionary –
such as pension cuts or VAT hikes.
Unfortunately, that fine document was replaced by the Eurogroup
President, minutes before the Eurogroup meeting, with another document that
took us back not even to last Thursday – but indeed to last Wednesday, when we
were pressurised to sign up to an extension not of the loan agreement but of
the programme itself, being offered only the nebulous two word phrase ‘some
flexibility’. When asked what that meant, we got no concrete answer. Did it
mean that, over the next few months, pensions would be cut but not as much as
originally prescribed? By none at all?
Under those circumstances, it proved impossible for the Greek
government, despite our infinite good will, to sign the offered communiqué.
And so the discussions continue. We are ready and willing to do
whatever it takes to reach an honourable agreement over the next few days. Our
government will accept all the conditions that it can deliver upon and which do
not reinforce our society’s long crisis.
No one has the right to work toward an impasse – especially one that is
mutually detrimental to the people of Europe.
Annex 3 (Junker-Moscovici draft
here) / Annex 3 (Dijsselbloem draft here)
Παράρτημα I-
Προσχέδιο Moscovici
15
Feb - close of business
Today,
the Eurogroup took stock of the current situation in Greece, based on intensive
dialogue between the new Greek authorities and the Institutions.
The
Greek authorities have expressed their commitment to a broader, socially just
and stronger reform process aimed at durably improving growth prospects. In
particular, the Hellenic Government commits to implementing long overdue
reforms to tackle corruption and tax evasion, and upgrade the public
administration. It announced its intention to take urgent action to ensure a
fairer and more effective tax system and to contain the humanitarian crisis. It
will ensure that any new measures do not reverse existing commitments and are
fully funded. It will refrain from unilateral action and will work in close
agreement with its European and international partners.
Greece
will fully respect its commitments to partners to ensure sound and sustainable
public finances, by reaching and then sustaining sizeable primary balances. The
feasibility of reaching the fiscal target for 2015 will be considered in light
of evolving economic circumstances. Measures for reducing the debt burden and
achieving a further credible and sustainable reduction of the Greek debt-to-GDP
ratio should be considered in line with the commitment of the Eurogroup in
November 2012.
At
the same time, the Greek authorities reiterated their unequivocal commitment to
the financial obligations to all their creditors.
The
above forms a basis for an extension of the current loan agreement, which could
take the form of a [four-month] intermediate programme, as a transitional stage
to a new contract for growth for Greece, that will be deliberated and concluded
during this period.
When
considered useful, the European Commission will provide technical assistance to
Greece to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of reforms.
The
Eurogroup invites the Institutions to continue technical work with the Greek
authorities, including to identify intermediate financing needs, how they will
be covered and the appropriate conditionalities. The Institutions will report
to the Eurogroup by [21] February.
Παράρτημα ΙΙ- Προσχέδιο Dijsselbloem
16 February 2015 [14:45]
Preliminary and confidential
[Draft] Eurogroup statement on Greece
The Eurogroup
reiterates its appreciation for the remarkable adjustment efforts undertaken by
Greece and the Greek people over the
last years. Over the last week, the Eurogroup and the institutions have engaged
in an intensive dialogue with the new Greek authorities.
The Greek
authorities have expressed their strong commitment to a broader and deeper
reform process aimed at durably improving growth and employment, prospects,
[enhancing social fairness] and ensuring stability and resilience of the
financial sector. In particular, the Greek authorities commit to implementing
long overdue reforms to tackle corruption and tax evasion, and improving the
efficiency of the public administration. At the same time, the Greek
authorities reiterated their
unequivocal commitment to honour their financial obligations towards all their
creditors. The Greek authorities will make the most efficient use of the
continued provision of the technical assistance.
We discussed
the policy priorities of the new government on the basis of work undertaken by
the institutions and the Greek authorities. We welcomed that in a number of
areas the Greek policy priorities can contribute to a strengthening and better
implementation of the current financial assistance programme. The Greek
authorities have indicated that they intend to successfully conclude the
programme, taking into account the new government’s plans. In this context, we
intend to make the best use of the existing built-in flexibility in the current
programme. The Greek authorities gave their firm commitment to refrain from
unilateral action and will work in close agreement with its European and
international partners, especially in the filed of the tax policy,
privatization, labour market reforms, financial sectors, and pensions.
The Greek
authorities committed to ensure appropriate primary fiscal surpluses and
financing in order to guarantee debt sustainability in line with the targets
agreed in the November 2012 Eurogroup statement. Moreover, any new measures
should be funded, and not endanger financial stability.
On this basis,
the Greek authorities expressed their intention to request a six months
technical extension of the current programme as an intermediate step. . This
would bridge the time for the Greek authorities and the Eurogroup to work on a
follow-up arrangement. We also agreed
that the IMF would continue to play its role in this new arrangement. The Eurogoup
is favourable disposed to such a request by the Greek authorities.
Moreover, we
were informed by the EC, the ECB and the IMF that it would be prudent to extend
the availability period of the EFSF bonds in the HFSF buffer for six months, in
parallel to the extension of the EFSF programme. The Eurogroup looks favourably
at such an extension. Following a request by Greece, the EFSF can make the
necessary arrangements. The Eurogroup
emphasizes that these funds can be
used for bank recapitalization and resolution costs and will only be
released on the basis of an assessment by the institutions and a decision of
the Eurogroup.
We remain
committed to provide adequate support to Greece until it has regained full
market access as long as it honours its commitments within the agreed
framework.
